jul 5th, 2011 CE
kissinger shills for the hans.
reminds me of claude arpi's book on tibet, where he quotes an analyst who talks of the indian ambassador to china (k n panikkar?). he felt that the ambassador knew what the hans were up to before 1962, but figured the hans were going to win, so he might as well be on the winning side!
also, note how it has now become conventional wisdom what india made 'incursions' into china before 1962! in fact, to quote claude again, indians were selling rice to the chinese troops who were building roads in aksai chin!
with all due respect, i have to wonder: does india have a foreign policy?
soon i am afraid i'll have to wonder the same way about US policy towards china: they are so dazzled by them they don't know -- pardon the french -- their ass from their face.
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Ram Narayanan <ram@usindiafriendship.us>
Date: Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 11:06 AM
Subject: Henry Kissinger's new book wants the US to yield gracefully to China's rise (a la MUNICH PACT?)
To:
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67926/andrew-j-nathan/what-china-wants?page=show FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAGAZINE What China Wants
Bargaining With Beijing By Andrew J. Nathan July/August 2011 Henry Kissinger’s new book* argues that the United States should yield gracefully to China’s rise; Aaron Friedberg’s gives the opposite advice. By focusing on intentions instead of capabilities, both books overstate China’s actual power. ANDREW J. NATHAN is Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science at Columbia University and a co-author, with Andrew Scobell, of the forthcoming book China’s Search for Security. As a connoisseur of fine diplomacy, Henry Kissinger finds a lot of it to admire in China. His new book, cast as a history of Chinese foreign policy, traces the twists and turns of Chinese strategy since the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, quoting liberally from his numerous conversations with Chinese leaders. But On China is really neither history nor memoir. Its purpose is to argue that the United States should yield gracefully to China’s rise in order to avoid a tragic conflict. Aaron Friedberg gives the opposite advice. A Princeton professor and former foreign policy adviser to Vice President Dick Cheney, he analyzes the strategies that China and the United States have used in dealing with each other since the early 1990s and tries to decipher China’s intentions in the coming decades. In the face of growing Chinese power and ambition, the United States, he argues, must stand strong in those many areas in which China’s interests are adverse to its own. Together, the two books offer a window onto the strategic split over China among mainstream Republicans.
Kissinger likens Chinese diplomacy to the game of wei qi (equivalent to the Japanese game of go), a patient contest of encirclement in which victory is only relative. Chinese strategists view the quest for a decisive outcome as illusory. Instead, they play a game of "combative coexistence," seeking to improve their relative power position amid the ever-changing forces of world politics. At the necessary moment, one may deliver a salutary psychological shock and then withdraw, as the Chinese did to the Indians in 1962 to put a stop to incursions along their contested border, and as they did to the Soviets in 1969 to deter Moscow from probing Chinese positions along their frontier. On other occasions, one may hide one’s light and bide one’s time, as Deng Xiaoping famously advised his colleagues to do in 1991, telling them to maintain good relations with the United States while building up China’s strength. Or it might be useful to claim hurt dignity and designate a whole topic as nonnegotiable, as Beijing did in 1993-94 when U.S. President Bill Clinton tried to make favorable tariff rates conditional on improvements on human rights, and as it is doing today over territorial issues. Kissinger sees contrasts here with the usual approach of U.S. diplomats, which often frustrated him when he was running the show. Where American negotiators tend to compartmentalize issues and seek solutions, their Chinese counterparts prefer to integrate issues and seek understandings. Whereas Americans believe that agreements can be reached in one sector while disagreements are expressed in another, Chinese prefer to characterize the whole atmosphere as warm or cold, friendly or tense, creating an incentive for the other side to put disagreements on the back burner. Whereas Americans are troubled by deadlocks, Chinese know how to leverage them to keep pressure on the other side. American diplomacy is transactional; Chinese diplomacy, psychological.
From: Ram Narayanan <ram@usindiafriendship.us>
Date: Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 11:06 AM
Subject: Henry Kissinger's new book wants the US to yield gracefully to China's rise (a la MUNICH PACT?)
To:
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67926/andrew-j-nathan/what-china-wants?page=show FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAGAZINE What China Wants
Bargaining With Beijing By Andrew J. Nathan July/August 2011 Henry Kissinger’s new book* argues that the United States should yield gracefully to China’s rise; Aaron Friedberg’s gives the opposite advice. By focusing on intentions instead of capabilities, both books overstate China’s actual power. ANDREW J. NATHAN is Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science at Columbia University and a co-author, with Andrew Scobell, of the forthcoming book China’s Search for Security. As a connoisseur of fine diplomacy, Henry Kissinger finds a lot of it to admire in China. His new book, cast as a history of Chinese foreign policy, traces the twists and turns of Chinese strategy since the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, quoting liberally from his numerous conversations with Chinese leaders. But On China is really neither history nor memoir. Its purpose is to argue that the United States should yield gracefully to China’s rise in order to avoid a tragic conflict. Aaron Friedberg gives the opposite advice. A Princeton professor and former foreign policy adviser to Vice President Dick Cheney, he analyzes the strategies that China and the United States have used in dealing with each other since the early 1990s and tries to decipher China’s intentions in the coming decades. In the face of growing Chinese power and ambition, the United States, he argues, must stand strong in those many areas in which China’s interests are adverse to its own. Together, the two books offer a window onto the strategic split over China among mainstream Republicans.
Kissinger likens Chinese diplomacy to the game of wei qi (equivalent to the Japanese game of go), a patient contest of encirclement in which victory is only relative. Chinese strategists view the quest for a decisive outcome as illusory. Instead, they play a game of "combative coexistence," seeking to improve their relative power position amid the ever-changing forces of world politics. At the necessary moment, one may deliver a salutary psychological shock and then withdraw, as the Chinese did to the Indians in 1962 to put a stop to incursions along their contested border, and as they did to the Soviets in 1969 to deter Moscow from probing Chinese positions along their frontier. On other occasions, one may hide one’s light and bide one’s time, as Deng Xiaoping famously advised his colleagues to do in 1991, telling them to maintain good relations with the United States while building up China’s strength. Or it might be useful to claim hurt dignity and designate a whole topic as nonnegotiable, as Beijing did in 1993-94 when U.S. President Bill Clinton tried to make favorable tariff rates conditional on improvements on human rights, and as it is doing today over territorial issues. Kissinger sees contrasts here with the usual approach of U.S. diplomats, which often frustrated him when he was running the show. Where American negotiators tend to compartmentalize issues and seek solutions, their Chinese counterparts prefer to integrate issues and seek understandings. Whereas Americans believe that agreements can be reached in one sector while disagreements are expressed in another, Chinese prefer to characterize the whole atmosphere as warm or cold, friendly or tense, creating an incentive for the other side to put disagreements on the back burner. Whereas Americans are troubled by deadlocks, Chinese know how to leverage them to keep pressure on the other side. American diplomacy is transactional; Chinese diplomacy, psychological.
... deleted for copyright reasons. the excerpt above falls under fair use provisions
1 comment:
OT: Now who will protect us from Maoists?
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